Determinism vs. Free Will

                                                              Determinism vs. Free Will

'Ought-implies-can', causal determinism

and moral responsibility

JOHN MARTIN FISCHER

(1)Suppose some individual, John, does something morally wrong.

(2) If John's Xing was wrong, then he ought to have done something else instead.

(3) If John ought to have done something else instead, then he could have done something else instead.

(4) So John could have done something else instead.

(5) But if causal determinism is true, then John could not have done anything other than he actually did.

(6) So, if causal determinism is true, it cannot be the case  that John's Xing was wrong.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia:

Ought implies can is an ethical formula ascribed to Immanuel Kant that claims an agent, if morally obliged to perform a certain action, must logically be able to perform it: For if the moral law commands that we ought to be better human

beings now, it inescapably follows that we must be capable of  being better human beings.^[1]

The action to which the "ought" applies must indeed be possible  under natural conditions.^[2]

Kant believed this principle was a categorical freedom, bound only by the free will, as opposed to the Humean hypothetical freedom ("Free to do otherwise if I had so chosen").^[3]

In the context of philosophy of mind, the problem of free will takes on renewed intensity. This is certainly the case, at least, for materialistic determinists.^[2] According to this position, natural laws completely determine the course of the material world. Mental states, and therefore the will as well, would be material states, which means human behavior and decisions would be completely determined by natural laws. Some take this reasoning a step further: people cannot determine by themselves what they want and what they do. Consequently, they are not free.^[93]

This argumentation is rejected, on the one hand, by the compatibilists. Those who adopt this position suggest that the question "Are we free?" can only be answered once we have determined what the term "free" means. The opposite of "free" is not "caused" but "compelled" or "coerced". It is not appropriate to identify freedom with indetermination. A free act is one where the agent could have done otherwise if it had chosen otherwise. In this sense a person can be free even though determinism is true.^[93] The most important compatibilist in the history of the philosophy was David Hume.^[94] More recently, this position is defended, for example, by Daniel Dennett.^[95]

There seems to be as many theories about the presence or absence of free will as there are philosophers.  I find two views about the presence or absence of free will to predominate in the literature concerning the subject.

The older view, based on the classical Newtonian physics of cause and effect, maintains that a person’s background, such as their genetic inheritance, their up-bringing, and their culture, determines their behavior in its entirety, much the way gravity determines a planet’s trajectory around the Sun.  “Determinism” dictates that there is no “free will”, as all behavior is determined by prior events, all the way back to the Big Bang.

The newer view, based on Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle as contained in quantum physics, is called “compatibility”, in that the truth of cause and effect is accepted, but that “free will” also exists, or is compatible with the theory.  Future acts cannot be predicted with certainty based on past events because of the uncertainty inherent in the structure of Nature.  The ability to choose exists, but must be exercised for it to be realized.  This is where Kant’s dictum “Ought implies Can” comes into play.  If moral imperatives exist, then the ability to choose is implied, meaning “free will” exists.  If the compatibilists are correct, then one has the freedom to choose a course of action otherwise than what has been chosen. 

Determinism assumes physical determinism and psychic indeterminism are incompatible.   Given the quantum uncertainty inherent in the billions of neurons and trillions of molecules which make up the brain, psychic indeterminism, or the inability to predict future behavior based on past behavior, becomes possible.  Does this imply that human behavior is random?  No, it implies that choice exists, that it is not entirely determined by past events, that the outcome is not predictable in advance.  Choice is free and unpredictable, not predetermined by prior events.  I view the right of Free Will as analogous to the right to vote.  One has to exercise each to make them real.

If Determinism is correct, then there is no basis for morality, no basis for right or wrong, no basis on which to “choose”.  Personally, I reject this notion.  I make moral choices every day, and the freedom to do so is inherent in me.  I must exercise my rational mind when doing so, and I accept the consequences of my choices as they manifest themselves in my life.  I concede it is possible to proceed through one’s day in a mindless fashion, simply doing what one is “told” by outside forces.  The opposite to this kind of behavior is “mindfulness”, where one pays attention in a willful fashion to the choices one makes each day, with an eye on outcomes and consequences, and with morality in play.

“Mindfulness redirects the brain’s resources away from lower level limbic responses and toward higher level prefrontal cortex functions and this does not happen passively.  Rather, it requires both willful training and directed mental effort.”  Schwartz,  Quantum Physics and Consciousness, 2001.