Determinism vs. Free Will
'Ought-implies-can', causal determinism
and moral responsibility
JOHN MARTIN FISCHER
(1) Suppose some
individual, John, does something morally wrong.
(2) If John's Xing was wrong, then he ought to
have done something else instead.
(3) If John ought to have done something else
instead, then he could have done something else instead.
(4) So John could have
done something else instead.
(5) But if causal determinism is true, then John
could not have done anything other than he actually did.
(6) So, if causal
determinism is true, it cannot be the case that John's Xing was wrong.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia:
Ought implies can is an ethical formula
ascribed to Immanuel Kant that claims an agent, if morally obliged to
perform a certain action, must logically be able to perform it: For if the moral law
commands that we ought to be better human
beings now, it
inescapably follows that we must be capable of being better human beings.[1]
The action to which the "ought"
applies must indeed be possible under natural conditions.[2]
Kant believed this principle was a categorical freedom, bound
only by free
will, as opposed to the Humean hypothetical freedom ("Free
to do otherwise if I had so chosen").[3]
In the context of philosophy of mind, the
problem of free will takes on renewed intensity. This is certainly the case, at
least, for materialistic determinists.[2] According to this position, natural laws
completely determine the course of the material world. Mental states, and
therefore the will as well, would be material states, which means human
behavior and decisions would be completely determined by natural laws. Some
take this reasoning a step further: people cannot determine by themselves what
they want and what they do. Consequently, they are not free.[93]
This argumentation is rejected, on the one hand,
by the compatibilists. Those who adopt this position suggest
that the question "Are we free?" can only be answered once we have
determined what the term "free" means. The opposite of
"free" is not "caused" but "compelled" or "coerced".
It is not appropriate to identify freedom with indetermination. A free act is
one where the agent could have done otherwise if it had chosen otherwise. In
this sense, a person can be free even though determinism is true.[93] The most important compatibilist in the history
of the philosophy was David Hume.[94] More recently, this position has been defended, for
example, by Daniel Dennett.[95]
There
seem to be as many theories about the presence or absence of free will as
there are philosophers. I find two views
about the presence or absence of free will to predominate in the literature
concerning the subject.
The older
view, based on the classical Newtonian physics of cause and effect, maintains
that a person’s background, such as their genetic inheritance, their
upbringing, and their culture, determines their behavior in its entirety, much
the way gravity determines a planet’s trajectory around the Sun. “Determinism” dictates that there is no “free
will”, as all behavior is determined by prior events, all the way back to the
Big Bang.
The newer
view, based on Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle as contained in quantum
physics, is called “compatibility”, in that the truth of cause and effect is
accepted, but that “free will” also exists, or is compatible with the
theory. Future acts cannot be predicted
with certainty based on past events because of the uncertainty inherent in the
structure of Nature. The ability to
choose exists but must be exercised for it to be realized. This is where Kant’s dictum “Ought implies
Can” comes into play. If moral
imperatives exist, then the ability to choose is implied, meaning “free will”
exists. If the compatibilists are
correct, then one has the freedom to choose a course of action otherwise than
what has been chosen.
Determinism
assumes physical determinism and psychic indeterminism are incompatible. Given the quantum uncertainty inherent in
the billions of neurons and trillions of molecules that make up the brain,
psychic indeterminism, or the inability to predict future behavior based on
past behavior, becomes possible. Does
this imply that human behavior is random?
No, it implies that choice exists, that it is not entirely determined by
past events, and that the outcome is not predictable in advance. The choice is free and unpredictable, not predetermined
by prior events. I view the right of
Free Will as analogous to the right to vote.
One has to exercise each to make them real.
If
Determinism is correct, then there is no basis for morality, no basis for right
or wrong, and no basis on which to “choose”.
Personally, I reject this notion.
I make moral choices every day, and the freedom to do so is inherent in
me. I must exercise my rational mind
when doing so, and I accept the consequences of my choices as they manifest
themselves in my life. I concede it is
possible to proceed through one’s day mindlessly, simply doing what
one is “told” by outside forces. The
opposite of this kind of behavior is “mindfulness”, where one willfully pays attention to the choices one makes each day, with an eye on outcomes
and consequences, and with morality in play.
“Mindfulness
redirects the brain’s resources away from lower level limbic responses and
toward higher level prefrontal cortex functions and this does not happen
passively. Rather, it requires both
willful training and directed mental effort.”
Schwartz, Quantum Physics and
Consciousness, 2001.
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